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CAN PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONIZATION BE
SAVED?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRO ACT AS A
MODEL FOR EFFECTIVE NLRA REFORM
Christopher Adinolfi*
In February 2020, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the
Protecting the Right to Organize Act (“PRO Act”), one of the most
prolabor pieces of legislation since the creation of the current labor
relations framework in 1935. For almost seventy-five years, the substantive
text of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) has remained largely
unchanged, despite the pervasive increase of anti-labor hostility from
companies seeking to avoid the unionization of their workers. Across all
stages of unionization, organizers and bargaining agents face coercive
management tactics, diminished negotiating positions, the loss of collective
action tools, and a National Labor Relations Board without the ability to
effectively deter illicit activity. This Note examines the current framework’s
issues and the PRO Act’s attempt to remedy these problems by amending
the text of the NLRA. Although the legislation is the most comprehensive
piece of private sector labor reform since the inception of the NLRA, this
Note addresses the PRO Act’s deficiencies and advocates for a stronger,
more effective model for future federal labor law change.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 6, 2020, the Democrat-controlled House passed the
Protecting the Right to Organize Act (“PRO Act”),1 one of the most
prolabor bills passed since the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)2 in
1935.3 The PRO Act’s various provisions would significantly amend the
NLRA, attempting to reclaim the policy of encouraging collective
bargaining by protecting the “full freedom of association.”4 The legislation
seeks to realize this protection at three principal stages of the labor relations
process:
(1) union organizing drives and elections, (2) collective
bargaining contract negotiations, and (3) workers’ ability to exercise
collective economic pressure.5 Protection of the freedoms of association
and collective bargaining has been significantly diminished as a result of
the NLRA’s failure to adequately prevent illegal tactics employed by
companies seeking to avoid unionization.6
1. H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. (2020).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169; see Don Gonyea, House Democrats Pass Bill That Would
Protect Worker Organizing Efforts, NPR (Mar. 9, 2021, 9:18 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2021/03/09/975259434/house-democrats-pass-bill-that-would-protect-worker-organizingefforts [https://perma.cc/4JU9-8Z5K].
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.
4. Id. § 151 (“It is . . . the policy of the United States to . . . protect[] the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives
of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment . . . .”).
5. H.R. 2474.
6. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 8–9 (2019); see also Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep:
Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769,
1770, 1773–74 (1983) (arguing that private sector unionization has felt a “chilling effect” in
large part due to the NLRA framework, “the core legal structure” of American labor law that
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All of the major NLRA reform attempts for over half a century have
failed due to the Senate supermajority requirement to overcome a
filibuster.7 Therefore, even with a Democrat-controlled Senate, the PRO
Act will most likely fail to survive a Republican-led filibuster.8 Following
the 2020 election, the composition of the Senate has stifled the likelihood of
the PRO Act’s passage.9 Still, an assessment of the PRO Act’s potential for
substantial change is relevant for any future model that will be employed by
hopeful reformers. This Note analyzes the effectiveness of the PRO Act
and whether it could be used as a model for any future NLRA reform
attempts.
If passed, the PRO Act would amend the cornerstone of federal labor law
that has remained essentially unchanged for almost seventy-five years.10
As private sector union density has dropped to a mere 6 percent of the
workforce,11 the PRO Act seeks to restore the NLRA as an “effective
mechanism of workplace representation” that would revitalize efforts to
increase private sector unionization and, in turn, the ability to collectively
bargain.12 The freedoms to engage in organizing and collective bargaining
are considered fundamental human rights internationally.13 Yet, the
has been “providing employers with the opportunity and the incentives” to coerce employees
from forming unions).
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See infra notes 198–201 and accompanying text.
10. See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 14, 16 (2016) (stating that
the NLRA, “[a] sweepingly broad statute,” ushered in the “modern era of American labor
law” and established “an affirmative national policy in favor of collective bargaining”);
James J. Brudney, Gathering Moss: The NRLA’s Resistance to Legislative Change, 26
A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 161, 161 (2011) [hereinafter Brudney, Gathering Moss] (“In stark
contrast to . . . other regulatory schemes, Congress has made virtually no changes in the
NLRA [for sixty years].”); James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of
the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1595 (1996) [hereinafter Brudney, Reflections on
Group Action] (“Neither amendment of NLRA provisions nor routine review of NLRB
activities and events has served as a source for legislative renewal.”).
11. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., Economic News Release: Union Members
Summary (Jan. 22, 2010, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm
[https://perma.cc/P2VG-9S4K].
12. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1527, 1528, 1530 (2002) (arguing that the private sector labor laws in the United
States, which have “ossified” for more than fifty years, have been ineffective in enforcing
basic employee rights); see also Thomas Kochan et al., Who Wants to Join a Union?: A
Growing Number of Americans, MIT SLOAN: GOOD COMPANIES GOOD JOBS (Sept. 2, 2018),
https://gcgj.mit.edu/whats-new/blog/who-wants-join-union-growing-number-americans
[https://perma.cc/UK35-7KUE] (“The results obtained from nearly 4,000 respondents show
that 48 percent—nearly half of nonunionized workers—would join a union if given the
opportunity to do so.”).
13. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
(“Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of [one’s]
interests.”); INT’L LAB. ORG., DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT
WORK AND ITS FOLLOW-UP 2 (2d ed. 2010) (“[A]ll Members, even if they have not ratified
the Conventions in question, have an obligation . . . to promote and to realize, in good
faith . . . the principles concerning the fundamental rights of . . . freedom of association and
the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining.”). The United States has not
ratified ILO Convention No. 87 (Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
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NLRA’s weak protections and remedies for union organizing drives,
contract negotiations, and collective economic self-help have contributed to
the steep decline in private sector union density, diminishing these rights.14
Employers have learned to use the NLRA to their advantage, namely by
outsourcing production, conducting anti-union campaigns before elections,
and exploiting the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB or “the
Board”) long delays and small penalties that fail to disincentivize unfair
labor practices and bad-faith bargaining.15 Since the 1970s, employers
have steadily increased their use of retaliatory tactics.16 NLRB elections
have become fraught with intimidation and coercive tactics.17 Even if
employees are able to successfully unionize, years often pass before a union
obtains a first collective bargaining agreement (“first contract”), if it is able
to do so at all.18 During the period of negotiations for a first contract and
beyond, unions may face bad-faith negotiations,19 ineffective remedies,20
and a “gutted” ability to strike.21

Right to Organize) or Convention No. 98 (Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining
Convention), despite being a permanent member of the International Labor Organization that
has recognized the 1998 Declaration. See David Weissbrodt & Matthew Mason, Compliance
of the United States with International Labor Law, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1842, 1842, 1845–46
n.28 (2014).
14. See Andrias, supra note 10, at 6, 25 (arguing that the NLRA has facilitated
employers’ use of anti-union tactics, resulting in the “fail[ure] to protect workers’ statutory
right to organize”).
15. See id. at 23, 25–26; see also James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The
NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 221, 221 (2005) (“[T]he Board
has . . . weaken[ed] the rights of workers to engage in organizing and collective bargaining
under the [NLRA].”); James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike,
and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 522, 526 (2004) (explaining that the
ineffectiveness of labor law and the current state of the NLRB have stripped workers of the
right to strike and left workers without an effective means to hold employers accountable for
unfair labor practices).
16. See Weiler, supra note 6, at 1779–80; see also Andrias, supra note 10, at 22 (citation
omitted) (“Employers permanently replaced striking workers. They also closed union plants
and opened up low-wage nonunion plants in other locations.”).
17. See, e.g., KATE BRONFENBRENNER, ECON. POL’Y INST., NO HOLDS BARRED: THE
INTENSIFICATION
OF
EMPLOYER
OPPOSITION
TO
ORGANIZING
2
(2009),
https://files.epi.org/page/-/pdf/bp235.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA4R-JNH8] (“[E]mployers
threatened to close the plant in 57% of elections, discharged workers in 34%, and threatened
to cut wages and benefits in 47% of elections.”).
18. See id. at 22 (“Within one year . . . only 48% of organized units have . . .
agreements. By two years it increases to 63% and by three years to 70%. Only after more
than three years will 75% have obtained a first agreement.”).
19. See Andrias, supra note 10, at 26 (stating that the NLRB’s inability to impose
contract terms as a remedy for employers breaking good faith has resulted in employers
forcing delays over years); see infra Part I.A.2.
20. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 9 (2019) (arguing that the “statutory remedies for
violations of the [NLRA] are wholly inadequate”); see infra Part I.A.4.
21. See Craig Becker, “Better than a Strike”: Protecting New Forms of Collective Work
Stoppages Under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 353–54 (1994)
(explaining how the NLRB and courts have interpreted the NLRA to diminish the right to
strike).
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Reformers have attempted to amend the NLRA in a variety of ways.22
Yet over several decades, no significant reforms have passed both chambers
of Congress,23 leaving the NLRA largely unchanged since the passage of
the Taft-Hartley Act24 in 1947.25
The House passed the PRO Act to address the substantive and procedural
inadequacies of the NLRA and the NLRB to combat the “low rate of union
membership” that has contributed to pervasive income inequality.26 The
PRO Act should be viewed through the lens of private sector unions’
current issues, which stem from the NLRA’s language. This Note analyzes
the PRO Act’s mechanisms as a model for effective changes to the NLRA
that may combat the decline in private sector union density and the
diminishment of the freedoms to associate and collectively bargain.
Part I of this Note explains the most pressing legal issues resulting from
the NLRA’s inadequacies and three major failed labor law reforms. Part II
discusses the various provisions of the PRO Act. This topical analysis first
explains how the legislation seeks to amend the NLRA to effectively
combat a corresponding inadequacy and then determines whether that
mechanism would be effective. Part III advances improvements to the PRO
Act that should be included in any future reform model. By addressing
potential revisions to the legislation, this Note seeks to devise a more
thorough, effective model to adequately amend the entirety of the NLRA.
I. NLRA’S DEFICIENCIES AND RECENT REFORM ATTEMPTS
The NLRA’s original language has remained largely untouched for
almost seventy years.27 As employer resistance to unionization has become
“increasingly brazen,” the NLRA’s text and the NLRB have failed to
safeguard the NLRA’s basic ideals.28 The combination of anti-union tactics
and inefficient NLRB machinery have eroded labor relations in the United
States.29 Part I.A of this Note summarizes the NLRA’s inadequacies at the
three stages of labor relations, as well as the NLRB’s ineffective remedies
and procedures. Part I.B discusses three of the most important reform
attempts of the past fifty years.
A. The Most Pressing Issues Facing Private Sector Unions Today
Beginning in the 1970s, the decline in private sector union density
contributed to the rise in income inequality, which is now at the “highest
level since the Census Bureau started tracking it more than five decades
22. See infra Part I.B.
23. See infra Part I.B.
24. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197).
25. See supra notes 10, 12.
26. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 9–10 (2019).
27. See Estlund, supra note 12, at 1532–33.
28. Id. at 1529.
29. Id.
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ago.”30 In the United States, “a worker covered by a union contract earns
13.2 percent more in wages than a peer with similar education, occupation,
and experience in a nonunionized workplace in the same sector.”31 An
important part of this decline is employer opposition to unionization, which
the NLRA framework currently permits.32
Workers and unions face issues stemming from the NLRA’s current state
throughout a unionization drive and beyond. Part I.A.1 discusses the
NLRA’s election inadequacies and an employer’s ability to exploit the
NLRB’s weak enforcement against unfair labor practices (ULPs). Part
I.A.2 addresses the issues surrounding first contracts and the way the
NLRA facilitates the ability to bargain in bad faith. Part I.A.3 discusses the
diminishment of the right to strike and the ban on secondary boycotts. Part
I.A.4 addresses the weaknesses of NLRB enforcement generally. Part I.A.5
briefly discusses issues surrounding employee classification in the NLRA.
1. Organizing Drives and Elections
To certify a union as the exclusive bargaining representative, the NLRA
requires that employees first file a petition signed by 30 percent or more of
the workers in the bargaining unit.33 The NLRB then conducts a “secret
ballot” election, in which a majority vote of the unit is required to certify
the union.34 Employers may also voluntarily recognize a union without an
election if a majority of employees sign authorization cards.35 However, an

30. See Taylor Telford, Income Inequality in America Is the Highest It’s Been Since
Census Bureau Started Tracking It, Data Shows, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/09/26/income-inequality-america-highestits-been-since-census-started-tracking-it-data-show/ [https://perma.cc/B8CJ-5DDK]; see
also JOSH BIVENS ET AL., ECON. POL’Y INST., HOW TODAY’S UNIONS HELP WORKING PEOPLE:
GIVING WORKERS THE POWER TO IMPROVE THEIR JOBS AND UNRIG THE ECONOMY 7 (2017),
https://files.epi.org/pdf/133275.pdf [https://perma.cc/94M5-U3ZW] (“[U]nion decline can
explain one-third of the rise in wage inequality among men and one-fifth . . . among
women.”).
31. BIVENS ET AL., supra note 30, at 9. High union density can facilitate wage increases
and better working conditions for nonunion workers sector wide. Id. at 9–10; see also U.S.
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., supra note 11 (breaking down unionization rates by sector,
occupation, industry, and state).
32. See BIVENS ET AL., supra note 30, at 9. The decline in private sector unionization is
attributable not solely to employer interference and NLRA inadequacies but also to the
evolution of the global economy. See Andrias, supra note 10, at 6. As manufacturing and
industrial production moved overseas, companies “fissured” their labor forces by creating
subcontracting hierarchies, and automation replaced full-time workforces as private sector
union density declined. See id. at 21–22. Still, these nonlegal factors are also present in
Europe, where union density and collective bargaining coverage is far greater, which lends
credence to the idea that the American legal framework is failing to protect the freedom to
associate. See Dylan Matthews, Europe Could Have the Secret to Saving America’s Unions,
VOX (Apr. 17, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/4/17/
15290674/union-labor-movement-europe-bargaining-fight-15-ghent [https://perma.cc/QUJ6ZRXL].
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1).
34. See id. § 159(a).
35. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 579 (1969).
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employer may reject these cards and demand that an NLRB election take
place.36
Since employers tend to avoid unionization, unions typically must turn to
the other statutory option for certification: an election.37 In the majority of
unionization attempts, known as unionization drives, organizers ensure that
the union has majority support before submitting the original petition.38
Employers in the overwhelming majority of elections conduct campaigns
to convince workers to vote against unionization.39 However, the NLRA
states that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of” their rights, including
“the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
[and] to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing.”40 Despite this statutory promise, employees are often subject to
coercive and retaliatory tactics before voting.41 These tactics include
captive audience meetings,42 interrogatory one-on-one supervisor
meetings,43 threats and actual changes in working conditions and plant
closures,44 harassment, and surveillance.45 Although many of these
activities are considered illegal ULPs,46 the NLRA penalties and
enforcement mechanisms are too meager and inefficient to disincentivize
employers from engaging in these abusive practices and effectively protect

36. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1).
37. See id. § 159(a).
38. See Kate Bronfenbrenner & Dorian Warren, The Empirical Case for Streamlining
the NLRB Certification Process 5 (Inst. for Soc. and Econ. Rsch. and Pol’y Working Paper,
2011) https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/74589/Bronfenbrenner102_The_
empirical_case.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/GE22-MX78] (“[T]oday 60
percent of all unions filing for NLRB elections file with at least 60 percent of the unit on
cards.”).
39. See BIVENS ET AL., supra note 30, at 19–20.
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158(a)(1).
41. See BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 17, at 2; Weiler, supra note 6, at 1777–78
(explaining that employer discharges and other election ULPs spiked in the 1970s during the
period between the initial filing and the NLRB election).
42. A “captive audience meeting” is a mandatory, employer-held meeting during work
hours in which management explains its views on an organizing drive. See infra notes 52–55
and accompanying text.
43. See BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 17, at 2.
44. See Textiles Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 273–75
(1965) (holding that a full plant closure, “even if . . . motivated by vindictiveness” is not a
ULP, while “discriminatory partial clos[ures]” may be ULPs); BRONFENBRENNER, supra
note 17, at 2 (“[E]mployers threatened to close the plant in 57% of elections . . . and
threatened to cut wages and benefits in 47% of elections.”).
45. See BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 17, at 2.
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)–(5). Most of the enumerated ULPs are listed under
§ 158(a)(1), which states that an employer cannot “interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157,” and § 158(a)(3), which
states that an employer cannot “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment . . . encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization.” Id. § 158(a)(1), (3). In addition, employers may not change the benefits
and work conditions of an employee without bargaining with the certified bargaining unit.
Id. § 158(a)(5).
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workers during drives.47 For example, if an employer illegally terminates
an employee for participating in a unionization drive, that employer is liable
only for that employee’s reinstatement and backpay, less any wages earned
during the interim period.48 If that employee files a charge with the NLRB,
the employer can use the process to its advantage by delaying any redress to
the employee and further hampering union organizing drives.49 These
small economic penalties are minor when compared to the potential cost of
having to pay higher wages and improvements to working conditions
sought through collective bargaining with a union representative.50
Therefore, an employer would commit the ULP and pay backpay—
benefiting from employees’ fear of retaliation—rather than deal with the
costs of a unionized workplace.51
Captive audience meetings have proven to be one of the most effective
tactics employers use during unionization drives.52 These mandatory
meetings are held during work hours on employers’ premises, where the
employers are in the strongest position to “to exert its economic authority
over employees and to play on fears of job loss.”53 The NLRA allows the
practice as part of an anti-union campaign permitted under the First
Amendment and in the name of employee free choice.54 The anti-union
effects of these meetings are compounded by the banning of union
representatives from accessing employers’ workplaces and restrictions to
employee information.55 Thus, while employers may ban “discussions of
47. See Andrias, supra note 10, at 26 (arguing that the NLRA’s small economic
penalties have contributed to exploitation by anti-union employers); BIVENS ET AL., supra
note 30, at 20; infra Part I.A.4.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c); see H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 20 (2019) (“Because the NLRB is
only empowered to award backpay, employers can commit serious violations . . . and avoid
paying any monetary amount because the violation did not directly cause an individual
monetary harm.”).
49. See James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition:
Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 833–34 (2005).
50. See David Lee & Alexandre Mas, Long-Run Impacts of Unions on Firms: New
Evidence from Financial Markets, 1961–1999, at 36 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 14709, 2009), https://www.nber.org/papers/w14709 [https://perma.cc/L75FY9R5] (comparing the costs of both union and nonunion employees, concluding that the
average cost of a union in market value is about $40,500 per worker).
51. See Weiler, supra note 6, at 1787–89.
52. See William T. Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on Certification
Elections: Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 560, 570–71 (1983);
Paul M. Secunda, The Contemporary “Fist Inside the Velvet Glove”: Employer Captive
Audience Meetings Under the NLRA, 5 FIU L. REV. 385, 385 (2010) (describing “captive
audience meetings” as meetings during the workday that occur “in the midst” of an active
union organizing campaign where employees are “compelled” to listen to a “one-way
conversation . . . about the evils of unionism”).
53. See Secunda, supra note 52, at 385; see also Cynthia Estlund, Response, Truth, Lies,
and Power at Work, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 349, 351 (2016) (“Employees do not
know enough about their legal rights at work . . . and they get much of their knowledge from
employers, who sometimes misrepresent the nature of those rights.”).
54. See In re Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 60, 802, 805–06 (1946); Secunda, supra note
52, at 393–95.
55. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 114 (1956) (“[The NLRA] does
not require that the employer permit the use of its facilities for organization.”); see also
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unionization during work time and in working areas,” employers are free to
discuss their opposition to unions with employees and compel their
attendance.56
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB57 held
that nonemployee union organizers do not have a right under the NLRA to
access employers’ premises and, therefore, contact employees in person at
work, unless “unique obstacles” exist as to render a union’s access to those
employees unreasonable.58 While organizers have a right to employee
names and addresses,59 employers enjoy unequal access to all other voting
information.60 Although NLRB elections utilize secrecy in an attempt to
fulfill the democratic ideals of an election process,61 “there are an equally
critical series of standards that must be met . . . for a vote to be deemed
democratic.”62 These standards include “the right to free speech . . . [and]
equal access to voters for all competing parties,” which, due to the current
framework, are granted only to employers during NLRB elections.63 Even
if a union succeeds in secretly filing a petition, the NLRB requires unions to
give employers notice before an election occurs.64 Once notified,
anti-union employers are able to use the NLRB’s slow election process to
deploy their campaigns.65
Today, a union will, at some point during its organizing drive, give
workers the prospect of approving the bargaining agent through a “card
check procedure” in which workers may sign “authorization cards.”66 If a
majority of workers express their intent to unionize by signing these cards,
the union will request that the employer approve and “enter into a collective
bargaining relationship.”67 An employer does not need to accept this
request, even if a majority of its employees have expressed their support for
the bargaining agent and may instead request that an NLRB election be
held.68

Gordon Lafer, What’s More Democratic Than a Secret Ballot?: The Case for Majority
Sign-Up, 11 WORKING USA: J. OF LAB. & SOC’Y 71, 73–74 (2008) (comparing NLRB
elections to democratic political elections to demonstrate the one-sided privileges granted to
employers).
56. Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules
of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 664 n.25 (2010).
57. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
58. Id. at 541.
59. See Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1245–46 (1966).
60. See Lafer, supra note 55, at 73.
61. Id. at 72.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 72–73.
64. See Sachs, supra note 56, at 665.
65. See Andrias, supra note 10, at 25–26 (“NLRB’s election machinery is
extraordinarily slow; employers are able to defeat organizing drives through delay and
attrition.”); Sachs, supra note 56, at 666 (“On average, an NLRB election is scheduled
forty-one days after the employees’ petition is filed.”).
66. See Brudney, supra note 49, at 821, 824.
67. Id. at 824.
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c).
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To deal with this impediment, unions hoping to become certified attempt
to utilize neutrality agreements, which are contracts between the union and
employer in which employers agree to stay neutral in organizing drives.69
Equipped with this neutrality protection, unions are able to utilize majority
card check support to become authorized bargaining agents, bypassing
NLRB elections.70
Although “most new union members in recent years” have resulted from
these voluntary recognition agreements,71 the NLRA’s only other statutory
method for certifying a union is through an NLRB secret election.72
Certified unions enjoy certain rights that are not afforded to unions
recognized voluntarily or under a bargaining order.73 For example, when a
union is certified, the possibility for decertification does not arise for a year;
however, if an employer voluntarily certifies through card check, this
period of time is a “reasonable” one.74 Certified unions are also afforded
the “protection against the filing of new election petitions by rival unions”
for a year.75
2. Contract Negotiations
Even if employees are able to successfully certify a union, the bargaining
agent must then successfully negotiate a first contract with the employer.76
Over half of all unions that win elections will be without a first contract one
year after the election, while close to 40 percent of those unions will not
have a contract two years after.77
The NLRA states that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to . . . refuse to bargain collectively,” which is the “performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative . . . to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith.”78 Although the policy of the

69. See Brudney, supra note 49, at 825–26.
70. Id. at 827.
71. See Cynthia Estlund, Freeing Employee Choice: The Case for Secrecy in Union
Organizing and Voting, 123 HARV. L. REV. F. 10, 11 (2010).
72. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union
Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 514 (1993).
73. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 598–99 (1969).
74. See id. at 599 n.14.
75. Id. Certified unions are also protected “for a reasonable period . . . against . . .
claims that the union no longer represents a majority [and] . . . recognitional picketing by
rival unions.” Id. (citation omitted). In addition, these unions have the statutory freedom
from restrictions “in work assignment disputes . . . and on recognitional and organizational
picketing.” Id. (citation omitted).
76. See Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and
First-Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE
OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75, 86 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994) (explaining that since
23 percent of employers refused to recognize the elected unions, employers were able to
drag out the time without a first contract, decreasing the percentage of successful contracts
by 13 percent).
77. See BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 17, at 3.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (emphasis added).

2021]

CAN PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONIZATION BE SAVED?

113

NLRA is to encourage collective bargaining,79 the Supreme Court has held
that the NLRA does not empower the Board to compel agreement following
bad-faith bargaining by an employer,80 based on the Court’s analysis of
section 8(d)’s text, reinforced by references to freedom of contract.81 When
an employer breaks its obligation to bargain in good faith, the only remedy
available under the NLRA is an NLRB order to resume good-faith
bargaining.82 This allows employers to continue to commit ULPs, such as
surface bargaining,83 without the threat or levying of monetary fines.84
The NLRA’s inability to force contract terms has contributed to
significant NLRA violations,85 including dragging out negotiations over
periods of years and outright refusals to negotiate.86 Unions may be forced
to sign “face-saving” contracts that fail to achieve substantial gains for
employees.87 In addition, the NLRA does not permit the use of mandatory
arbitration, giving employers even more opportunities to avoid bargaining
outright with their employees’ certified agents.88 The NLRA does allow for
mediation in limited instances: when either party to a contract wants to
terminate or modify that contract.89 Because of ineffective penalties, the
NLRB’s inability to deter bad-faith bargaining, and the lack of effective
alternative dispute resolution, the NLRA currently fails to uphold its policy
goals of ensuring that employers bargain in good faith.90
3. Collective Action Issues
Many scholars argue that the right to strike is the most important means
of collective action and central to labor’s bargaining position.91 Despite
79. See id. § 151.
80. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 109 (1970) (holding that the NLRA does
not provide for “governmental review of proposals for collective-bargaining agreements and
compulsory submission to one side’s demands”).
81. Id. at 107.
82. See 29 U.S.C. § 160.
83. See Marc Mandelman & Kevin Manara, Staying Above the Surface—Surface
Bargaining Claims Under the National Labor Relations Act, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
261, 261 (2007) (stating that surface bargaining occurs when a party “seemingly engag[es]
in arms [sic] length negotiations while concealing a purposeful strategy to make bargaining
futile and to avoid reaching an agreement”).
84. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 20 (2019).
85. See Andrias, supra note 10, at 25.
86. See Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects
for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 360–61 (1984) (“[S]uch an order does not
expose the violator to the more tangible sanction of contempt proceedings for continued
intransigence until a federal court of appeals chooses to enforce it. But by that time—
approximately three years later—the damage has long been done . . . .”).
87. Id. at 361.
88. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 27 (2019).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(3); see infra note 191.
90. See Estlund, supra note 71, at 16. See generally Weiler, supra note 86, at 352.
91. See, e.g., JULIUS G. GETMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON UNIONS: WHY LABOR LAW IS
FAILING AMERICAN WORKERS 52 (2016) (“[C]oercion for settlement of bargaining disputes
was to come from the strike and its potential to harm both sides.”); Becker, supra note 21, at
351 (“The strike is the essence of collective labor activity.”); James J. Brudney, To Strike or
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this view, the use of strikes has “declined dramatically”92 due to a number
of related issues,93 including the employer’s right to permanently replace
strikers, a ban on secondary boycotts, and the narrow types of strikes
protected by the NLRA.
An employer’s right to permanently replace strikers has “nullif[ied] the
statutory regime of collective bargaining for those employees” who either
face the threat of the replacements or have experienced the replacements
themselves.94 In 1938, the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co.,95 interpreted the NLRA to hold that once a strike has begun,
an employer has the ability to “issue an ultimatum to return to work or face
permanent replacement.”96 As the use of a strike may lead to permanent
job replacements, the threat of these replacements has the ability to
completely wipe out the current work unit and, therefore, the union itself
Disputes involving working conditions are
from the workplace.97
transformed into threats or actual discharges when permanent replacements
are permitted.98
In that sense, the NLRA, as currently interpreted, allows employers to
utilize strikes for their own benefit.99 The threat alone of losing one’s job
to a permanent striker is a “powerful disincentive to engage in protected
activity.”100 Although the NLRA purportedly encourages collective
bargaining, the permanent replacement doctrine is wholly “inconsistent
with the policy of free choice.”101
In addition to the impact of permanent replacements, different forms of
strikes have been restricted in scope and content by both courts and the

Not to Strike, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 65, 77 (reviewing JULIUS G. GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF
LOCAL 14:
PAPERWORKERS, POLITICS, AND PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS (1998))
(“Historically, the economic strike has been the foundation for trade unionism in this
country.”); Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike,
1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 547 (“The strike . . . is an essential component of the collective
bargaining system.”).
92. See Finkin, supra note 91, at 548.
93. The decline of the strike is also attributable to nonlegal issues, such as increasing
globalization. See Becker, supra note 21, at 353. The shift in cultural attitudes against
striking workers is exemplified by the “increased willingness to employ permanent
replacements” over forty years after the doctrine was recognized; President Ronald Reagan’s
firing and replacing of the striking PATCO air traffic controllers in 1981 emboldened
employers. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical
Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 440–41 (2002). Still, “the law has
played an equally decisive role,” as federal courts and the NLRB have limited the scope of
the NLRA. See Becker, supra note 21, at 353–54.
94. See Finkin, supra note 91, at 549.
95. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
96. See Finkin, supra note 91, at 567; see also Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 346.
97. See Befort, supra note 93, at 440.
98. See Brudney, supra note 91, at 72.
99. See Pope, supra note 15, at 528–29 (“[W]orkers who exercise their statutory right to
strike are punished with the loss of their jobs.”).
100. Id. at 529.
101. See GETMAN, supra note 91, at 68 (stating that “[s]everal leading union organizers”
believe the permanent replacement doctrine to be employers’ “most powerful” tool).
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NLRB,102 further diminishing the value of the tool.103 Partial strikes have
been categorized as a single unprotected group of “strikes that stop short of
a total work stoppage lasting for an indefinite length of time.”104 The
phrase “partial strikes” is misleading, encompassing not only partial
strikes105 but also slow-downs106 and intermittent strikes.107 If the form of
strike deployed is not a traditional strike in which employees notify the
employer, completely abandon work, and leave the workplace until the
strike ends, the NLRA does not protect its use.108
Though it dates back to the 1940s, the ban on secondary boycotts by
unions is still felt today and further diminishes unions’ ability to leverage
economic power to improve working conditions.109 Congress’s passage of
the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 included a statutory ban on certain kinds of
secondary boycotts.110 Today, employees cannot use picketing to put
pressure on “secondary” organizations,111 including suppliers within its
own chain, whether this is to get the primary employer to recognize their
union, to influence contract negotiations, or to pursue any other priority of
labor power.112
102. See Becker, supra note 21, at 364–71 (discussing the narrowing of the scope of
forms of strikes under NLRA protection); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S.
240, 256 (1939) (holding that sit-down strikes are not protected under the NLRA).
103. See Becker, supra note 21, at 362 (“Rules narrowing the forms of strikes protected
by the NLRA have dovetailed with those allowing permanent striker replacement, leaving
individual workers with vastly diminished legal protections and unions with little substantive
leverage in the bargaining process.”).
104. Id. at 356. Courts have not held that partial strikes are prohibited but that they are
“unprotected against retaliatory employer self-help.” Id. at 383. The NLRB has “repeatedly
confirmed the existence of an unprotected class of strikes” under the NLRA, specifically
activity that is “partial” or “intermittent.” Id.; see also Michael M. Oswalt, Improvisational
Unionism, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 662 (2016) (analyzing whether successive actions are
considered intermittent strikes and arguing that the ban on these strikes is “irreconcilable
with the NLRA’s plain text”).
105. See Becker, supra note 21, at 356 n.24 (defining “partial strike” as “the refusal to
perform specific tasks or to work at specific times or on specific days”).
106. See id. (defining “slow-down” as “the refusal to perform work at the ordinary or
expected pace”).
107. See id. (defining “intermittent strike” as “repeated short strikes not involving the
refusal to perform specific tasks or to work at specific times or on specific days”).
108. See id. at 354–55.
109. See Richard A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding NLRB Interpretation of
Section 8(b)(4)(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 905, 907
(2005) (stating that the NLRA does not define “secondary boycott” but that it can be referred
to as “a combination to harm one person by coercing others to harm him”). An example of
this activity is when a union in a dispute with company A in which that union “pressures A
indirectly, by making A’s clients, suppliers or other persons with whom A conducts business
the target.” Id. at 908 (typeface altered).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4).
111. See id. But see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574, 578 (1988) (holding that consumer handbilling is lawful
secondary pressure under the First Amendment).
112. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 34 (2019); see also Andrias, supra note 10, at 18, 32
(listing as secondary boycott examples workers picketing at “corporate headquarters
designed to coerce franchisees to negotiate a contract” or forcing employers to contract only
with unionized buyers and suppliers).
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In today’s global economy, work is increasingly outsourced up and down
the supply chain and out to third parties.113 Businesses are adopting
“fissured workplaces,” where employers are breaking up and outsourcing
different types of work domestically and across borders to
subcontractors.114 Traditional “vertically integrated corporation[s]” have
declined, while the United States has seen the rise of scattered work “across
multiple employers.”115 Secondary boycotts are particularly useful to
encourage unionization and collective action in fissured industries, not only
within a single bargaining unit but also along supply chains and across
sectors.116 Secondary boycotting allows for disruption along “supply
chain[s] to . . . other . . . employers” to improve the conditions not only of
the boycotters’ unit—by pressuring suppliers and other employers—but
also of all of the employees in those other workplaces.117
4. NLRB Order Enforcement
The NLRA has undercut the channels to remedy unlawful practices
employers carry out. The NLRA states that the NLRB’s general counsel
has “final authority . . . in respect of the prosecution of” ULP complaints.118
If the NLRB general counsel decides not to pursue the violation, the worker
is left without means for redress.119 Petitioning the Board for the decision
is the only way that the NLRA provides for private sector employees to
seek redress, as the Board has jurisdiction over all ULP hearings.120
Meanwhile, an employee suing under “[v]irtually every major employee
rights statute enacted by Congress,”121 such as Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,122 has the right to bring a private suit.123 As the decision not
to issue a complaint is not subject to judicial review,124 an employee is left
without recourse.125

113. See David Weil & Tanya Goldman, Labor Standards, the Fissured Workplace, and
the On-Demand Economy, 20 PERSPS. ON WORK 26, 27 (2016).
114. Id.
115. See MARK BARENBERG, WIDENING THE SCOPE OF WORKER ORGANIZING: LEGAL
REFORMS TO FACILITATE MULTI-EMPLOYER ORGANIZING, BARGAINING, AND STRIKING 3
(2015),
https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/RI-Widening-ScopeWorker-Organizing-201510-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EEM9-LLAA].
116. Id. at 21.
117. Id.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d).
119. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 21–22 (2019) (“[T]he NLRB ‘sparingly’ uses its
authority to seek court injunctions for temporary reinstatement.”).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (“[T]he Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of
any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any
industry . . . .”).
121. See Brudney, supra note 15, at 231.
122. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
123. See Brudney, supra note 15, at 231.
124. See NLRB v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 122–23
(1987).
125. See Brudney, supra note 15, at 231.
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The absence of a private right to sue has contributed to the
ineffectiveness of the NLRA in three important ways. First, employees are
at the mercy of the NLRB to seek redress for any alleged ULPs.126 Even in
instances of discharges or other serious economic harm, the NLRB general
counsel has the right to pursue violations in cases where employees’
economic livelihoods may be at stake.127 Second, directing redress to the
Board’s administrative decision-making rather than judicial adjudication
limits reform through private litigation.128 Lawsuits have not only
generated bodies of precedent for federal workplace statutes but also “have
helped fuel Congress’s continued interest in revisiting and revising the
basic regulatory scheme.”129 Instead, the Board retains full power to
adjudicate all ULP claims without “press[ing] for private rights of
action.”130 Third, deferring to the NLRB’s expertise on all labor relations
issues congests the Board’s docket and furthers delays.
Although “empowered” to stop ULPs,131 the NLRB does not have the
statutory right to enforce its own orders, unlike other “self-enforcing”
administrative agencies.132 Instead, the NLRA gives the Board the “power
to petition any court of appeals of the United States.”133 Similar to its slow
election mechanisms,134 the Board’s inability to enforce its own orders
against ULPs causes inefficient delays,135 which inevitably aid in
employers’ exploitation during organizing and negotiations.136 One study
has shown that the median time between the filing of a charge and when the
Board issues an order is 483 days.137 Administrative law judges (ALJs)
hear cases when a ULP is issued.138 These judgments are often appealed
and lead to additional extensive delays of upwards of five years.139
The impact of the Board’s rigid enforcement system is heightened by the
ineffective penalties, which fail to disincentivize employers from carrying
out serious ULPs.140 The NLRB “cannot authorize civil monetary
126. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
127. See id.
128. See Brudney, supra note 15, at 232–33.
129. Id. at 232.
130. Id. at 233.
131. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
132. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 9, 21 (2019).
133. 29 U.S.C § 160(e).
134. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
135. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 21 (2019).
136. See supra notes 47–51, 85–87 and accompanying text; see also Bronfenbrenner,
supra note 76, at 86 (explaining that when employers refused to recognize certified unions,
the objections filed with the NLRB delayed negotiations for first contracts, resulting in a
“negative impact” on those contracts’ terms for the employees).
137. 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 152 (2009).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 160.
139. See BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 17, at 3.
140. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 9 (2019) (“[T]he statutory remedies for violations of
the [NLRA] are wholly inadequate.”); BIVENS ET AL., supra note 30, at 19–20 (“While the
[NLRA] . . . makes it illegal for employers to intimidate, coerce, or fire workers involved in
union-organizing campaigns, the penalties are insufficient to provide a serious economic
disincentive for such behavior.”).

118

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

penalties,”141 including punitive damages, nor may it bring criminal charges
against an employer.142 Instead, the Board may only post notices, reinstate
fired workers, award back pay, or rerun elections.143 The most serious
penalty the Board may issue is a bargaining order, which is often ignored or
dragged out.144
5. Employer-Employee Classification
The NLRA’s framework was created to work within traditional,
long-term employer-employee relationships based on the “industrial model
for production.”145 Today, these relationships are being replaced in part by
the willingness of employers to classify certain workers as independent
contractors, a group that falls outside the purview of the NLRA’s definition
of a covered “employee.”146 The rise of this “gig economy,” in which
employers classify workers as “independent contractors,” has resulted in the
ability to avoid the NLRA’s strictures and unionization through
misclassification.147 In addition, employers’ use of subcontractors and
franchising has contributed to this “skirt[ing] [of] almost all labor law
protections for employees.”148
The difficulty with the misclassification of workers is the fact-intensive
nature of the determination.149 As “gig workers” have characteristics that
are associated with both employees and independent contractors, the text of
the NLRA is ill-suited for the determination.150 Therefore, a new test
should be built into the definition of “employee” to categorize this new
class of workers into protected workers or unprotected independent
contractors.
B. Prominent Reform Failures and the NLRA
The NLRA has undergone “virtually no changes” since the 1940s.151
Despite its nearly seventy-year “ossification,”152 reformers have tried to
amend the NLRA several times, hoping to align the statutory text with its
underlying intent.153 These attempts focused on specific areas of the
NLRA’s weaknesses. Today, however, reform must reflect the interplay of
141. H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 9.
142. See BIVENS ET AL., supra note 30, at 20 n.75.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. See William J. Tronsor, Unions for Workers in the Gig Economy: Time for a New
Labor Movement, 69 LAB. L.J. 181, 181 (2018).
146. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); see Tronsor, supra note 145, at 183. An in-depth discussion of
this classification issue is outside the purview of this Note but worth noting when discussing
the effectiveness of the PRO Act.
147. See Tronsor, supra note 145, at 183.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 184.
150. See id.
151. See Brudney, Gathering Moss, supra note 10, at 161.
152. See Estlund, supra note 12, at 1530.
153. See infra Part II.B.
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the NLRA as a regulatory scheme that chronologically mirrors real-world
unionization. Still, these reforms are valuable comparisons that are helpful
in determining how to effectively solve the NLRA’s deficiencies.
This section will address the three reforms that had passed at least one
chamber of Congress but later failed before successfully amending the
NLRA. The Labor Reform Act of 1977,154 the Workplace Fairness Act of
1991,155 and the Employee Free Choice Act of 2008156 all demonstrate how
Congress has previously approached the issues surrounding diminished
private sector unionization.
1. The Labor Reform Act of 1977
The Labor Reform Act of 1977 (LRA) passed the House in October
1977.157 By 1977, exploitation of the NLRA’s remedial deficiencies had
become widespread, and the NLRA could not effectively deter employers
from committing ULPs during organizing drives.158 The LRA sought to
amend the NLRA by addressing procedural issues with the law,159
bolstering remedies “to fully compensate employees victimized by
violations of the Act” and cutting delays stemming from NLRB
Specifically, the LRA took a four-part approach:
procedures.160
(1) improve representation election procedures, (2) expedite decisions in
ULP cases, (3) compensate and safeguard workers fired for protected
activity, and (4) increase remedies for employer bargaining delays.161
To improve representation elections, the legislation would have amended
the NLRA to streamline when the NLRB must hold an election after
receiving a petition.162 The LRA would also have streamlined appeals of
ALJ decisions.163 In addition, the Board would have needed to promulgate
a rule that would give union representatives the ability to communicate with
the employees in an “equivalent manner” as employers could.164
Additionally, two remedial features were introduced by the LRA to
bolster protections for workers who are fired for engaging in protected
activities. First, the LRA would have amended the NLRA by doubling the

154. H.R. 8410, 95th Cong. (1977).
155. H.R. 5, 102d Cong. (1991).
156. H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007).
157. H.R. 8410.
158. See Estlund, supra note 12, at 1540 (“[T]he [LRA] sought to address . . . the
overwhelming advantages that employers enjoy in union campaigns by virtue of . . . the
original Act’s inadequate deterrence of employer misconduct.”).
159. H.R. REP. NO. 95-637, at 8 (1977) (stating that procedural reform was necessary, as
NLRA procedures were being exploited by employers); Brudney, Gathering Moss, supra
note 10, at 170.
160. H.R. REP. NO. 95-637, at 4.
161. Id. at 5–8.
162. See id. at 5.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 6 (noting that employers enjoyed the one-sided ability to speak to
employees in the workplace during working hours about the elections).
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backpay awarded without deducting interim earnings.165 Second, the
legislation would require the NLRB to seek an injunction whenever an
alleged ULP involved an illegal discharge.166 To combat the increasing
number of employers refusing to bargain in good faith to settle upon a first
contract, the LRA would have “award[ed] the employees compensation for
the delay in bargaining” at factories where bargaining lawfully resulted in a
first contract.167
The Senate’s version of the bill failed due to a filibuster in June 1978.168
Still, the LRA serves as an example of Congress’s attempt to revitalize
private sector union organization campaigns by fixing procedural delays
that could end union drives at any point. This attempt did have two
significant deficiencies that have been addressed by the PRO Act.169 First,
the legislation did not create a private right of action. Giving employees
another channel for redress would have facilitated the LRA’s goal of
reducing NLRB procedural delays and protecting the right to organize.170
Second, the legislation would have implemented improved, yet still weak,
monetary penalties. Doubling backpay without deductions for interim
earnings is menial compared to the economic costs of unionization.171 The
LRA failed to include other forms of monetary awards, such as liquidated
damages that would be available for private lawsuits.
2. The Workplace Fairness Act of 1991
The Workplace Fairness Act of 1991172 (WFA) also concentrated its
efforts on a specific stage of NLRA weakness: the practice of hiring
permanent replacements for strikers in labor disputes.173 The WFA passed
the House in July 1991,174 but, like the LRA, could not survive a Senate
filibuster, even with majority support.175 The WFA’s purpose was to
outlaw the employer practice of permanently replacing workers by
statutorily designating the action as a ULP.176 As discussed in Part I.A.3,
the threat of permanent replacements alone has the ability to completely

165. See id. at 7.
166. See id.; H.R. 8410, 95th Cong. § 8(3) (2d Sess. 1978).
167. See id. at 8.
168. See Brudney, Gathering Moss, supra note 10, at 170.
169. See infra Part II.A.
170. See supra notes 126–30, 135–36 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
172. H.R. 5, 102d Cong. (1991).
173. Id.
174. Id. An almost identical legislative attempt was carried out in 1993 to designate
permanent replacements as ULPs, but that attempt failed due to the Senate filibuster after a
majority 53-47 vote. See Helen Dewar, Senate Fails to Break Filibuster on Striker
Replacement Bill, WASH. POST (July 13, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
archive/politics/1994/07/13/senate-fails-to-break-filibuster-on-striker-replacementbill/32b7dc5f-e77f-462b-acee-da15529a2a03/ [https://perma.cc/SQL5-6XQJ].
175. See Brudney, Gathering Moss, supra note 10, at 173. The bill was withdrawn due to
a filibuster after a cloture vote of 57-42. Id. at 173 n.79.
176. H.R. 5.
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“destabilize[] labor-management relations” by nullifying workers’ right to
strike,177 the core of a union’s economic leverage against an employer.178
A majority in the House of Representatives understood that permanent
replacements undermine the entire process, nullifying the right to strike
and, therefore, outright diminishing a union’s bargaining position.”179 The
WFA would thus amend the NLRA by adding a provision that designates
“offering” or “granting” a permanent replacement of an employee who “has
exercised the right . . . to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining” against a ULP.180
The WFA focused specifically on the loss of the right to strike by adding
explicit language that would nullify any interpretation that could result in
the survival of the permanent replacement doctrine. The amendment would
have sufficiently prohibited striking, an important strengthening of the
NLRA for organized labor. The legislation exemplifies how to implement a
successful solution to a specific NLRA inadequacy.
3. The Employee Free Choice Act of 2008
The Employee Free Choice Act of 2008181 (EFCA) passed the House in
March 2007.182 By the late 2000s, employers had succeeded in utilizing
NLRB election rules and delays to quash union organizing drives.183 The
penalties for ULPs began to be treated as the “mere cost of doing business
to prevent” unionization.184 The House had started to take seriously the
effect of bad faith bargaining on the part of employers after the certification
of a union.185 With these issues in mind, the purpose of the EFCA was to
amend the NLRA to “restor[e] workers’ freedom to organize and
collectively bargain” by “protect[ing] the . . . full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment.”186
Congress took a three-pronged approach: (1) give employees the option
of certifying a bargaining unit by a majority sign-up in lieu of an NLRB
election, (2) strengthen penalties for NLRA violations, and (3) allow for
177. H.R. REP. NO. 102-57, pt. 3, at 2 (1991).
178. Id. at 13 (“The ultimate form of . . . peaceful concerted activity is the economic
strike . . . the primary method for resolving disputes.”); see also supra Part I.A.3.
179. Id. at 3, 12 (claiming that the ability to permanently replace “reduces collective
bargaining to collective begging”).
180. H.R. 5, 102d Cong. § 1(2) (1991).
181. H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007).
182. Id.
183. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-23, at 8, 20 (2007) (explaining how delays in certifying
results and management’s exclusive access to employee information and the work premises
contributes to the stripping away of the freedom to organize); supra Part I.A.1.
184. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-23, at 15–16; supra Part I.A.1.
185. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-23, at 23 (discussing the difficulties of enforcing the
obligation to bargain in good faith and explaining how employers’ ability to delay the
process could “ultimately bust [a] union”); supra Part I.A.2.
186. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-23, at 3.
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referrals by either party to mediate and arbitrate contract disputes if the
parties could not reach a first contract.187 First, the EFCA would have
provided for statutory protection of majority sign-ups for certification.188 If
the NLRB receives authorization cards signed by a majority of the
employees in the unit, the union would be certified and the employer would
not be able to refuse to bargain and demand an election.189 Second, the
EFCA sought to increase penalties, including three times backpay for an
unlawful discharge or discrimination, civil penalties levied by the NLRB of
up to $20,000 per ULP, and a requirement that the Board “seek a federal
court injunction . . . whenever there is reasonable cause” of the threat of, or
carrying out of, an illegal firing or discrimination.190 Third, since the
NLRA does not “provide for the use of binding arbitration,”191 the EFCA
would have amended the NLRA to provide the option to request mediation
after ninety days of bargaining and binding arbitration if an agreement had
not been reached within thirty days of mediation.192
As with its reform attempt predecessors before it, the EFCA was blocked
by a filibuster in the Senate in June 2007.193 The EFCA had managed to
garner strong opinions amongst the public, resulting in a scholarly debate
on whether it would have had a positive, substantive effect on private sector
unionization.194 Regardless of its merits, compared to the LRA and the
WFA, the EFCA took a more comprehensive approach to NLRA reform.
Congress sought to ensure the freedom to associate by addressing the
interplay between election interference, bad faith post-certification
bargaining, and inadequate deterrence penalties. The PRO Act builds upon

187. See id. at 6.
188. See id. at 23.
189. See id. This authorization card process has been labeled as the “card check
procedure” among labor law scholars. See Sachs, supra note 56, at 657.
190. H.R. REP. NO. 110-23, at 6–7.
191. Id. at 24. The NLRA did allow for “the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
(FMCS) [to] provide mediation . . . services upon its own motion or upon request of one or
more of the parties to the dispute, whenever it believes that the dispute threatens a
substantial interruption to commerce.” Id.
192. Id. at 25.
193. See ROSS EISENBREY & DAVID KUSNET, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE EMPLOYEE FREE
CHOICE ACT:
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 1 (2009), https://files.epi.org/page//efcaquestions.pdf [https://perma.cc/K77G-H4D8].
194. See, e.g., Lance Compa, Not Dead Yet: Preserving Labor Law Strengths While
Exploring New Labor Law Strategies, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 609, 614 (2014) (arguing that
NLRA reform should focus on “fair ground rules” for elections with secret ballots, rather
than mandatory card checks); Michael M. Oswalt, Automatic Elections, 4 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 801, 833–34 (2014) (proposing that “regularly scheduled, automatic elections” for each
worker in the unit should be held annually). See generally Sachs, supra note 56
(recommending that employees be able to cast support by card check secretly in their own
homes or over the internet or phone due to the possibility of coercion by both sides). But see
Brudney, supra note 49, at 841, 849 (explaining that, despite the argument that employees
need the freedom of their own choice to associate or not, the NLRB election paradigm has
deteriorated, completely failing to protect employee free choice and proposing future
reliance on neutrality agreements and card checks).
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this measure’s penalty provisions, but largely ignores the EFCA’s effort to
work outside the NLRB election process.195
II. THE MOST RECENT LABOR REFORM MODEL: THE PRO ACT
The three major reform attempts discussed in Part I.B failed to garner
enough support in the Senate to successfully amend the NLRA.196 As the
2020 election came to a close, Democrats won the presidency and an
outright majority in the House of Representatives.197 Despite their control
of the Senate, Democrats do not have a supermajority large enough to
defeat a filibuster.198 Although calls to end the filibuster have gained
traction,199 abolition is unlikely, even with a majority.200 Therefore, as past
reforms have shown, this version of the PRO Act will most likely fail in the
Senate.201
A discussion of the PRO Act is useful for building a future NLRA reform
model. This bill is more comprehensive and detailed than any of the
previous reforms that have passed the House.202
The legislation seeks to both procedurally and substantively amend the
NLRA across all stages of unionization, a more aggressive approach than
those of the LRA, WPA, and EFCA. The PRO Act’s purpose is “to
safeguard workers’ full freedom of association and to remedy longstanding
weaknesses that fail to protect workers’ rights.”203 The legislation is an
overhaul of the current framework that addresses the NLRA in terms of
election interference, contract negotiations, the right to strike in different
forms, delays in NLRB procedure, and remedies.204 This part presents a
topical discussion of the PRO Act’s various provisions across the stages of
unionization and an evaluation of whether the reform would successfully
solve the framework’s most pressing problems.

195. See infra Part I.A.1.
196. See supra notes 168, 175, 193 and accompanying text.
197. See Jonathan Martin & Alexander Burns, Biden Wins Presidency, Ending Four
Tumultuous Years Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/11/07/us/politics/biden-election.html [https://perma.cc/2SEE-YADL]; Ella Nilsen,
House Democrats Will Keep Their Majority for Two More Years, VOX (Nov. 8, 2020, 8:33
PM),
https://www.vox.com/2020/11/8/21539959/election-2020-house-democrats-controlmajority [https://perma.cc/3ZHK-YT8Z].
198. See Norman Ornstein, Democrats Can’t Kill the Filibuster. But They Can Gut It.,
WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/03/02/manchinfilibuster-never-sinema/ [https://perma.cc/DP9Y-2TSK]; Nilsen, supra note 197.
199. See Molly E. Reynolds, What is the Senate Filibuster, and What Would It Take to
Eliminate It?, BROOKINGS (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/
votervital/what-is-the-senate-filibuster-and-what-would-it-take-to-eliminate-it/
[https://perma.cc/64TM-UMM6].
200. See id.
201. See supra notes 168, 175, 193 and accompanying text.
202. See supra Part I.B.
203. H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 8–9 (2019).
204. Protecting the Right to Organize Act, H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. (2020).
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A. Strengthening the Position of Unions During NLRB Elections
Due to the NLRA’s inability to deter election interference, unions try to
maintain secrecy for as long as possible during an organizing drive.205
Despite involving only the workers’ choice of whether to certify, a union
must notify the employer of the campaign prior to an election.206 Once
management is informed, an employer campaign can be deployed to deter
employees from certifying the union.207 NLRB elections have become
wrought with interference, failing to maintain democratic principles upheld
in political elections.208 The penalties provided for in the NLRA have
proven too limited in pecuniary terms and too dependent on agency
discretion to actually deter ULPs.209
The PRO Act works within the NLRB election framework, attempting to
hold employers accountable for violations, rather than overhauling the
entire voting process.210 For example, captive audience meetings are added
to the list of ULPs, as are any mandatory anti-union activity that is not
related to a worker’s job.211 Voluntary meetings are still permitted because
of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.212 Regarding
the actual vote itself, the legislation permits the union to request the manner
in which the election is to take place—whether it be by mail, electronically,
at work, or at a neutral site.213 Employers must give employee information
to the union within two days of the declaration of an NLRB election or face
penalties for committing a ULP.214 This includes not only names and
addresses but also “work locations, shifts, job classifications . . . personal
landline and mobile telephone numbers, and work and personal email
addresses.”215
In terms of specific remedies to election interference, the PRO Act
requires the NLRB to presume that an employer’s violative conduct
affected the outcome of an election where the employer has been found to
have committed a ULP and if at one point there had been majority support
for certification.216 Thus, the NLRB will make a rebuttable presumption
that the election would have resulted in the certification of the union and
205. See Sachs, supra note 56, at 665 (discussing how “the intensity of employer
opposition to unionization” forces organizing drives underground).
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See Richard B. Freeman, What Can We Learn from the NLRA to Create Labor Law
for the Twenty-First Century? 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 327, 331 (2011) (discussing how,
despite the NLRA’s attempt to follow democratic election fundamentals, the result has been
a “failure of NLRA elections to resemble the ideal laboratory conditions”).
209. See supra notes 47, 50–51 and accompanying text.
210. See H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. § 2(e)(1) (2020).
211. Id. § 2(d)(3) (“[I]t shall be an unfair labor practice . . . for any employer to require or
coerce an employee to attend or participate in such employer’s campaign activities unrelated
to the employee’s job duties . . . .”).
212. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 23 (2019).
213. H.R. 2474, § 2(e)(1)(A).
214. Id. § 2(d)(4).
215. Id.
216. Id. § 2(e)(1)(A).
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compel that certification.217 If a ULP is committed before the election
takes place, the employer may be subjected to both damages and the
rebuttable presumption.218
The PRO Act seems to have thoroughly addressed the largest problems
of NLRB elections: weak penalties, additional ULPs for mandatory
anti-union activities, manner and place of voting alternatives, streamlined
or improved NLRB machinery procedures, bilateral information
transparency, and the possibility of a certification by the NLRB if the
employer illegally interferes under the NLRA. Unions, equipped with
equal information, should be better able to facilitate educational
conversations with potential members. Employers, fearing an order to
certify, may be deterred from illegally interfering with an employee’s free
choice.
Still, the legislation is ill-equipped to solve the issues of certification.
Due to the position of employers over the working conditions of laborers,
the idea of an adversarial election will always be undemocratic compared to
its model—democratic political elections.219 Even with all of these
changes, the PRO Act fails to overhaul the election process, or at least
create another alternative process for certification,220 as the EFCA had
attempted to do in the late 2000s.221 The legislation instead tries to work
from within the current certification framework to maintain the status quo
of electing a union through a secret ballot.222
Even within the election framework, the legislation fails to address
several key points. While the PRO Act improves upon the inequality of
positions, employers would still have the constitutional right to wage
anti-union campaigns under the First Amendment.223 Therefore, employers
would still host meetings to sway employees, so long as an employee
agrees to attend the meeting.224 The PRO Act also fails to overturn the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lechmere that bans union representatives from
accessing workplace premises.225
The idea of holding an election to cast support is superfluous, especially
as unions today already wait until they have majority support in a
bargaining unit before filing a petition.226 In addition, the PRO Act does
not change the requirement that an employer be given notice before an
217. Id.
218. Id. § 2(e)(1)(A), (i)(1)(A).
219. See Lafer, supra note 55, at 72–73 (arguing that NLRB elections fail to live up to
any of the baseline standards of a “free and fair election” and that the notion that “secret
ballots” create a true democratic election is false).
220. See H.R. 2474, § 2(e)(1)(A).
221. See supra Part I.B.3.
222. See H.R. 2474, § 2(e)(1)(A).
223. See Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First
Amendment, 16 U.C. BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 381–82 (1995).
224. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 23 (2019) (“The PRO Act does not prohibit meetings
that are truly voluntary.”).
225. See Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 541 (1992).
226. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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election is commenced.227 The legislation fails to overhaul the election
process for a majority sign-up method akin to that of the EFCA. As the
certification of the bargaining representative is the critical starting point for
a union, this issue must be addressed in any future legislative reform
attempt.228
B. Facilitating Good-Faith Bargaining and First Contracts
The NLRA’s inadequacies in terms of contract negotiations are two-fold:
(1) the difficulty in ensuring that employers bargain in good faith; and (2)
the inability to compel agreements due to freedom of contract.229 The
freedom to collectively bargain rests on the presumption that the union will
negotiate with an employer that, in fear of economic harm resulting from
collective action, will reciprocate and act in good faith.230 The entirety of
the NLRA’s labor-management relations framework rests on the idea of
collective bargaining.231 The NLRA explicitly states that the refusal by “an
employer . . . to bargain collectively” is a ULP.232 This duty to bargain
includes the statutory requirement that the negotiations be in good faith.233
The PRO Act creates a three-step framework, similar to that of the
EFCA, to deal with the inadequacies at the negotiations stage of
unionization.234 First, the legislation requires the parties to begin collective
bargaining within ten days of notice by one party to the other with the intent
to start the negotiation process.235 The parties “shall make every
reasonable effort” to reach a first contract.236 Second, if the parties cannot
reach an agreement within ninety days from the first date of negotiations,
either the union or the employer may request mediation services.237 Third,
if the parties still cannot reach an agreement within a thirty-day period of
mediation, the mediation servicer must mandate arbitration by a
three-member arbitration panel to settle on a binding contract for two
years.238 The panel is selected by the parties. The union chooses one
arbitrator, the employer chooses the second, and a third neutral arbitrator is

227. See supra notes 205–07 and accompanying text.
228. See supra Part I.A.1.
229. See supra Part I.A.2.
230. See Finkin, supra note 91, at 547–48.
231. See Andrias, supra note 10, at 14.
232. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d).
233. Id.
234. H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. § 2(d)(4)(K) (2020); see supra Part I.A.2.
235. H.R. 2474, § 2(d)(4)(K).
236. Id.
237. Id. (“If after the expiration of the 90-day period . . . or such additional period as the
parties may agree upon . . . either party may notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service of the existence of a dispute and request mediation.”).
238. Id. (“If after the expiration of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the
request for mediation is made . . . or such additional period as the parties may agree upon,
the [Federal Mediation and Conciliation] Service is not able to bring the parties to agreement
by conciliation, the Service shall refer the dispute to a tripartite arbitration panel . . . .”).
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mutually agreed upon.239 Each party has fourteen days to choose its
arbitrator so as to avoid delaying the negotiations further.240
Working in tandem with the stronger monetary penalties for all ULPs,241
the PRO Act would effectively solve the issue of first contract disputes and
employer failure to bargain in good faith. Despite freedom of contract
blocking the NLRB from imposing agreement terms,242 the legislation
sufficiently amends the NLRA to give unions multiple opportunities to
confront bad faith throughout the negotiations with the option to use
mediation and arbitration.243 Whereas the NLRA currently only permits
mediation in circumstances of “substantial interruption of commerce,”244
the PRO Act would give either party the ability to request mediation and
then mandatory binding arbitration.245
However, it is worthwhile to note an important procedural deficiency that
the PRO Act would embed in the NLRA. The legislation explicitly allows
the parties to specify longer periods of time to start bargaining, to bargain
before mediation, and to request arbitration.246 The text lays out default
timeframes with the phrase “or such additional period as the parties may
agree upon.”247 If the employer is in a significantly better bargaining
position than the union, that employer may be able to strong-arm longer
timetables, prolonging negotiations.
C. Restoring the Right to Strike
Despite the NLRA’s language disclaiming that nothing in it should be
“construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike,”248 interpretations of the NLRA have in essence nullified
In particular, the interpretations allowing permanent
striking.249
replacements of strikers, the bans on all forms of strike other than the
traditional strike, and the ban on the secondary boycotts have all gutted
striking.250 All of these practices are at odds with the text of the NLRA and
its purpose to facilitate collective bargaining,251 as the economic leverage
of a strike gives workers the collective power to negotiate for better
working conditions.252
In a similar fashion to its good-faith negotiations provisions, the PRO
Act succinctly and explicitly addresses the diminishment of the right to
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
Id.
See infra Part II.D.
See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 109 (1970).
H.R. 2474, § 2(d)(4)(K).
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
H.R. 2474, § 2(d)(4)(K).
Id.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 163.
See supra Part I.A.3.
See supra Part I.A.3.
See 29 U.S.C. § 151.
See Becker, supra note 21, at 351.
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strike in several key provisions.253 First, the legislation overturns the
Mackay Radio doctrine by explicitly listing threats to replace a striker and
the actual permanent replacement of a striker as ULPs.254 “[T]o promise,
threaten, or take any action . . . to permanently replace” a worker under the
newly expanded definition of “strike” would result in hefty penalties for the
employer.255
Second, the legislation explicitly expands the forms of collective action
that can be utilized.256 The PRO Act would amend the NLRA to state
“[t]hat the duration, scope, frequency, or intermittence of any strike or
strikes shall not render such strike or strikes unprotected or prohibited.”257
Third, the PRO Act would repeal the ban on secondary boycotts.258
Allowing employees to carry out secondary boycotts has numerous
benefits, including improving a work unit’s own terms and conditions of
employment, improving the terms and conditions across a supply chain, and
pressuring suppliers and other employers to accept unionization.259
Restoring this right would have important implications in today’s global
economy, as unions would be able to utilize the form to reach
subcontractors to improve their own bargaining positions, while improving
the conditions and unionization of workers across borders and sectors.260
These provisions affecting the right to strike are the strongest and most
effective PRO Act attempts in terms of holistically improving the use of the
tool. The legislation overhauls the text of the NLRA to end permanent
replacements, the ban on different forms of the strike, and the prohibition
on secondary boycotts. By ending the practice of permanent replacements,
unions once again would be able to reclaim the ability to strike to improve
their employees’ working conditions without fear of job loss.261 In
addition, the expansion of different forms of striking gives employees
flexibility in applying economic pressure; these forms include “sit-down
strikes, slowdowns, refusals to perform specific tasks, and intermittent
strikes.”262 This expanded flexibility would “more accurately represent
employee dissatisfaction,” as workers could strike in ways that are more
spontaneous based on current grievances, rather than having to plan a
traditional strike “aim[ed] to redress past injury and to secure favorable
terms of future employment.”263
In sum, the PRO Act would effectively restore the right to strike. If
passed, the provisions would not only protect the ability to strike without
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. § 2(d)(1)(B) (2020).
Id.
Id. § 2(d)(1)(B), (i)(1)(A).
Id. § 2(j).
Id.
Id. § 2(d)(2).
See supra notes 112–13, 116–17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
See Becker, supra note 21, at 354 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 406.
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fear of reprisal and job loss to permanent replacements but also strengthen
the options employees have to change their working conditions and affect
the workplace conditions in employers’ supply chains. The legislation
would significantly improve most of the major deficiencies that have
pervasively diminished the right to strike. Therefore, any future model that
follows the PRO Act’s approach to strike reform would effectively amend
the NLRA’s deficiencies that have significantly reduced the negotiating
position of unions.
D. Improving NLRB Procedures and Penalties
At every stage of unionization, the NLRB’s slow procedures and meager
penalties fail to effectively deter violations of the NLRA.264 The NLRA
inadequately facilitates collective bargaining not only by allowing
employers to absorb small monetary penalties and avoid NLRB orders265
but also by prolonging union attempts to organize and negotiate for
contracts.266 The only channel employees have to seek redress is through
the NLRB general counsel’s decision to prosecute a ULP, as workers do not
have a private right to sue an employer.267 The NLRB cannot issue
self-enforcing orders and can only petition courts, extending the delays to
certification or contract agreement.268
The PRO Act aims to expand the remedial options for employees who
have suffered from employers’ ULPs and give teeth to the penalties
available to the NLRB. In terms of channels of redress, the legislation
grants a private right of action “in the appropriate district court” to
employees who allege a ULP, yielding not only backpay but also
consequential damages, liquidated damages, and possibly even punitive
damages.269 Employees would have ninety days to exercise this right sixty
days after either “filing of a charge with the Board” or “the date the Board
notifies the person that no complaint shall issue.”270 An employee must
wait sixty days or until notified that the NLRB general counsel has declined
to prosecute the ULP after the employee files a petition with the Board.271
Thus, an employee cannot bring a suit until filing a petition with the Board
and after the sixty-day period has elapsed.272
Regarding the decision to prosecute, the PRO Act would amend the
NLRA to direct the NLRB general counsel “to seek injunctive relief
whenever an employee suffers a . . . discharge [or] other serious economic
harm.”273 In addition, “the preliminary investigation of” any filed ULP that
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

See supra Part I.A.4.
See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d).
29 U.S.C § 160(e); see supra notes 132–39 and accompanying text.
H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. § 2(i)(B) (2020).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 22.
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involves these charges would be “given priority over all other cases except”
other discharge or serious economic harm cases.274
The legislation would also grant the Board the ability to institute
self-enforcing orders.275 The PRO Act would give the NLRB the power to
levy a civil penalty of upwards of $10,000 for “fail[ure] or neglect[] to
obey” an order.276 The provision states that “[e]ach separate violation of
such an order shall be a separate offense” but that every day that an
offender continues to “fail or neglect” constitutes a separate violation of the
order.277 If the NLRB decides to sue the violator of the order, a court,
under the amended NLRA text, would have the explicit power to issue
injunctive relief.278
Seeking to improve a framework that currently does not give the Board
any right to dole out monetary penalties aside from backpay less interim
earnings,279 the PRO Act would amend the NLRA to grant the NLRB the
ability to levy civil penalties.280 The legislation states that “in addition to
any remedy ordered by the Board,”281 employers may face a fine of more
than $50,000 for ULP violations under the NLRA.282 In addition, the
legislation would allow for Board determinations of “director or officer’s
personal liability [when] warranted,” resulting in a monetary civil award
against that director or officer.283
Following the specific intention of protecting employees from violations
involving discharge or serious economic harm, an employer that commits
this type of ULP multiple times within a five-year period would face a
mandatory double penalty of more than $100,000 per ULP.284 If the Board
finds that an employer has violated the NLRA by carrying out these ULPs,
the NLRB would be required to award the employee a similar reward that
could be achieved through a private suit: “back pay without any reduction,
front pay (when appropriate), consequential damages, and an additional
amount as liquidated damages equal to two times the amount of damages
awarded.”285

274. Id. at 104.
275. H.R. 2474, § 2(g)(1)(C).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See id.
279. Andrias, supra note 10, at 25.
280. See H.R. 2474, § 2(i)(1)(B).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. (“[A] civil penalty . . . may also be assessed against any director or officer . . .
who directed or committed the violation, had established a policy that led to such a violation,
or had actual or constructive knowledge of and the authority to prevent the violation and
failed to prevent the violation.”).
284. Id. The legislation directs the Board to determine these penalties by considering
“the gravity of the [ULP] . . . the impact . . . on the charging party, on other persons seeking
to exercise rights guaranteed by this Act, and on the public interest . . . and the gross income
of the employer.” Id.
285. Id. § 2(f); see supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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The PRO Act significantly changes the current NLRA procedures and
penalties. The legislation would open more channels for employees to seek
redress and give the NLRB the ability to enforce its own orders and levy
civil monetary fines. Compared to the current framework, these changes
would improve on the remedial aspects of private sector labor relations.
However, the amended NLRA framework faces two challenges in light of
these changes. First, the private right of action only arises sixty days after
filing or notification that the Board will not prosecute.286 Second, it may
also be the case that, despite self-enforcement, the fines are still too meager
to truly deter employers from committing ULPs.287
E. Creating a New Test for Employee Classification
The “gig economy” has created an entirely new class of workers who fall
in between the definitions of “employee” and “independent contractor.”288
As this gives employers the ability to avoid unionization and protects
collective bargaining under the NLRA, the current labor-management
framework needs a new test to make the determination.289
The PRO Act would change the definition of “employee,” based on an
“ABC Test.”290 This test provides that the default status of a worker is
“employee” unless that worker satisfies three criteria.291 The specific
language of the three criteria is:
(A) the individual is free from control and direction in connection with
the performance of the service, both under the contract for the
performance of service and in fact;
(B) the service is performed outside the usual course of the business of the
employer; and
(C) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established
trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as that
involved in the service performed.292

This test focuses not only on the degree of control that a worker has but
also on the service performed itself.293 Providing a test that requires
satisfaction of all three criteria ensures that more workers would be able to
enjoy the protections of the NLRA and that workers would not be subject to
misclassification as independent contractors.

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. § 2(i)(B).
See supra notes 47, 51–52 and accompanying text.
See Tronsor, supra note 145, at 184.
See supra Part I.A.5.
H.R. 2474, § 2(a)(2).
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III. THE PRO ACT AS A MODEL FOR EFFECTIVE CHANGE
Compared to previous reform attempts, the PRO Act is a sweeping piece
of legislation that, if passed, would significantly improve the position of
organized labor in the private sector of the United States.294 Despite its
breadth, the PRO Act still fails to overhaul the current NLRA framework as
thoroughly as possible.295 This part discusses possible solutions to
lingering issues in order of the principal stages of unionization that should
be incorporated into any future legislation attempting a comprehensive
overhaul of the NLRA’s current framework.
As discussed in Part II.C, the PRO Act would sufficiently amend the
NLRA’s strike provisions.296 As stated in Part II.E, the legislation’s ABC
Test would also sufficiently amend the NLRA to ensure that employers
cannot misclassify their workers as independent contractors.297 As these
provisions are sufficient to successfully amend the NLRA and should be
adopted by any future model,298 this Note does not discuss additional
reforms to these stages of unionization.
Part III.A proposes that any reform model should amend the NLRA to
incorporate a card check procedure as the default method of certification.
Part III.B recommends an emphasis on alternative dispute resolution and
changes to the default timeframes for mediation and arbitration that the
PRO Act would add to the NLRA. Part III.C recommends stronger NLRB
enforcement mechanisms, including an immediate private right of action,
more rigid monetary penalties than those utilized in the PRO Act, and the
potential for director and officer criminal liability for egregious conduct.
A. Card Check Authorization to Certify
In terms of elections, the PRO Act continues to work within the
NLRB-election framework,299 which would still be subject to anti-union
campaigns under the First Amendment.300 The decision to collectively
bargain is an employee’s choice;301 an NLRB election, unless held
immediately upon the initial filing, will always give employers the chance
to exert influence over their workers’ decisions.302 NLRB procedures were

294. See supra Parts II.A–E.
295. See supra Parts II.A–E.
296. See supra Part II.C.
297. See supra Part II.E.
298. See supra Parts II.C, II.E.
299. See H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. § 2(e) (2020).
300. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 49, at 854 (explaining that First Amendment law has
allowed for corporate entities to avoid regulation of speech).
301. See Sachs, supra note 56, at 661–62 (“[W]hile the outcome of the employees’
decisionmaking process [whether to unionize] will impact employers, this fact does not
entitle employers to an affirmative right to intervene in that process.”).
302. See supra Part I.A.1.
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never meant to be adversarial in nature;303 rather, they are a means to
ensure the freedom of association.304
As one of the NLRA’s purposes is to safeguard this freedom,305 any
future model should include alternative methods of certification. For
example, an argument against the EFCA in the late 2000s was that the
NLRA should be amended to replace the current NLRB election machinery
with a rapid election regime.306 This alternative would work within the
NLRB-election framework with all of the NLRA organizing rules in
place.307 An NLRB election would immediately take place after a union
files its initial petition, avoiding any employer interference.308 As
discussed in Part I.A.1, unions are abandoning the election certification
process and turning instead to more effective methods outside the
system.309
Instead, in an attempt similar to the EFCA,310 future labor relations
legislation should implement a mandatory card check procedure. Card
check processes bypass the opportunity for employer interference by
securing certification immediately upon majority support.311 Unlike the
PRO Act’s attempt to amend the election procedure,312 card check would
work outside the current framework, focusing organizing drives more on
employee choice rather than on holding onto support against an anti-union
campaign.313 Most union drives have already turned to card check and
neutrality agreements for certification.314 Alongside stronger penalties and
the ability to self-enforce,315 the Board’s certification of a bargaining agent
through card check would both lend legitimacy to immediate majority
employee support and ensure recognition without employer interference.316
Card check recognition can be implemented in a few different ways.317
Two important characteristics, in particular, that would affect unionization
drives are: (1) whether card check is an option or the mandatory process

303. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-347, at 24 (2019) (“In the legislative history of the NLRA,
Congress did not contemplate giving employers standing as parties in representation
procedures, because these procedures are investigative, not adversarial, in nature.”).
304. See Finkin, supra note 91, at 547–48.
305. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
306. See Sachs, supra note 56, at 658.
307. See id. at 667 (explaining that a rapid elections regime would still require a petition
to the NLRB for an election, the Board to give notice to the employer that the drive is
occurring, and an employee vote in “a secret ballot election conducted on the employer’s
property”).
308. Id. at 667–68.
309. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
310. See supra Part II.C.
311. See Sachs, supra note 56, at 658.
312. See H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. § 2(e) (2020).
313. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
315. See supra Part II.D.
316. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.B.3.
317. See Sachs, supra note 56, at 718.
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and (2) the manner in which employees signal their support for the
bargaining agent.318
As discussed in Part I.A.3, card check recognition is an optional method
for unionization without the official support of NLRB certification.319
Since authorization cards are a more effective method for recognition,320
the NLRA should be amended to allow for official certification by the
Board, not just an alternative option outside the purview of the statute.321
Since the option would be more effective than NLRB elections and would
better preserve employee free choice,322 future reform models should
implement card check as the centerpiece for certification.
As for the card check procedure, while the process, as is, allows for
unionization without management influence,323 the way in which
authorization is expressed may also facilitate pro-union coercion from
organizers or fellow employees.324 To ensure that employee choice is
safeguarded, workers should have the opportunity to cast their support not
only at work but also in the privacy of their own homes, away from any
coercive influence.325 Future legislation should amend the NLRA to permit
the Board to accept not only authorization cards signed by hand and given
to union organizers but also authorization cards signed at home and
submitted by mail, phone, or the internet.326 Employees need a channel of
certification that prevents any external coercive interference.327
With stronger penalties and improved NLRB enforcement machinery,328
an amended NLRA could also significantly safeguard election procedures
as a reserve option for certification.329 The NLRB needs to have the ability
to limit employer interference and reduce delays so that certification is
more akin to an instant ballot.330
Using the LRA as a model, the NLRA should statutorily expedite
election procedures by holding an election immediately upon the filing of a
petition.331
Card check is preferable because the process allows
certification immediately upon filing, whereas the equivalent timing using
the election framework would only be the filing of an election petition.332

318. See id.
319. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
320. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.B.3.
321. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
322. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.B.3.
323. See Sachs, supra note 56, at 658.
324. Id. at 657.
325. See supra notes 52–65 and accompanying text.
326. See Sachs, supra note 56, at 721–23 (explaining how electronic voting gives
employees flexibility and privacy to make their decisions without experiencing coercion
from either the union or management).
327. See supra Part II.A.
328. See supra Part II.A.
329. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.A.4, II.B.3.
330. See supra notes 135–42 and accompanying text.
331. See supra Part I.B.1.
332. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.B.3.
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Still, any reform that works within the election framework must aim to
reduce delays to a minimum.333
If future legislative attempts follow the PRO Act’s direction and try to
amend the certification process within the election framework,334 a
provision that explicitly overturns the Lechmere decision should be
included.335 Absent from the PRO Act,336 but included in the LRA,337 such
a provision allowing unions to access an employer’s premises further
equalizes the power imbalance between management and labor during
unionization drives.338 Alongside the proposed information symmetry
provision,339 unions would have a better chance to counter campaigns that
occur during working hours, balancing the information employees receive
before making their decisions.340
B. Private Negotiations and Default Timeframes
As to contract negotiations, the PRO Act’s provisions regarding
mediation and arbitration would effectively facilitate securing first
contracts.341 Based on the same timeframes as the EFCA,342 all legislative
reforms aimed at amending NLRA contract negotiations should include
provisions to foster cooperation between the parties with alternative dispute
resolution options,343 including mediation and arbitration when agreement
is not feasible.344 Still, future reform models could improve on the EFCA
and PRO Act by excluding the language that allows the parties to agree to
longer timeframes for negotiations.
In each provision regarding the timeframes for mediation and arbitration,
the PRO Act adds the phrase “or such additional period as the parties may
agree upon.”345 As a result, the PRO Act would amend the NLRA to
explicitly allow the parties to disregard the timing before either can request
mediation or arbitration.346 The issue at this stage of unionization is not
that unions do not have enough freedom to contract, but that employers are
bargaining in bad faith and prolonging negotiations to avoid first contracts
and break the bargaining unit.347 By giving the parties this freedom to
333. See supra notes 65, 135–42 and accompanying text.
334. See supra Part II.A.
335. See generally Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
336. See supra Part II.A.
337. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. The LRA sought to amend the NLRA to
give the parties equivalent manners of communication with the bargaining unit. See H.R.
REP. NO. 95-637, at 6 (1977).
338. See supra Part I.A.1.
339. See H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. § 2(d)(4) (2020).
340. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.B.1.
341. See supra Part II.B.
342. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 241–45 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 241–45 and accompanying text.
345. H.R. 2474, § 2(d)(4)(K).
346. Id.
347. See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text.
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ignore the timeframes set for alternative dispute resolution, the PRO Act
creates another channel to prolong negotiations.348
Instead, future models should maintain the timeframes set by the EFCA
and the PRO Act and amend the NLRA to further prevent any breach of the
duty to bargain in good faith.349 Deterring these ULPs requires stronger
penalties and NLRB enforcement.350 As such, NLRA reform should
include not only self-enforcing orders and monetary fines for negotiating in
bad faith, as the PRO Act includes,351 but also additional penalties for the
breach.352 For example, the reformers should consider the LRA penalty
that awards compensation at the new level rather than the status quo level
before unionization directly to workers where bargaining eventually ended
in a first contract.353 Penalizing employers in this manner deters not only
bad faith efforts to prevent a contract354 but also delays that occur to keep
the status quo working conditions for as long as possible.355
The PRO Act also focuses too strongly on trying to facilitate private
negotiations between the parties,356 as the legislation would amend the
NLRA to allow mediation requests only after the timeframe expires and for
arbitration thirty days after mediation has begun.357 Instead, future reforms
should build on the EFCA and PRO Act,358 leaving open an option for a
mediation request at any point during negotiations, subject to NLRB review
for a party that tries to use this option as a path to delay arbitration or
agreement.359 This option would strengthen the positions of bargaining
agents that are considerably weaker compared to larger employers.360
Together with a provision that would compel arbitration after mediation
fails to secure a contract, these requests would facilitate a greater number of
first contracts.361
C. Private Right of Action, Stronger Penalties, and Criminal Liability
A few improvements to the NLRB’s enforcement and penalties are worth
discussing. A legislative reform model to amend the NLRA should include:
(1) a private right of action whenever employees decide to sue their
employer, (2) stronger penalties above $50,000 for larger corporations, and
(3) criminal liability for directors and officers who purposefully direct a
company to commit serious ULPs against employees.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
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Under the PRO Act, a private right of action would arise for employees
alleging a ULP only sixty days after filing a petition or after the NLRB
general counsel decides not to pursue the violation and notifies the
complainant.362 Almost every other important federal employment statute
gives employees a private right of action in federal court “without serious
restriction.”363 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990,364 and the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act365 all vest a right to civil action.366 The PRO Act tries to remedy this
deficiency by granting a conditional private right of action under the
NLRA;367 instead, this right should exist whenever an employee wants to
bring a suit against an employer without needing to wait the required sixty
days, a period during which employers can impose poor working conditions
and implement ULPs in the workplace.368 In addition, as federal court
actions are adjudicative, unlike administrative NLRB decisions,369 every
case that is decided will have precedential effect,370 easing courts’
deference to the NLRB’s labor relations expertise and reducing the Board’s
busy docket.371 Similarly, NLRA reform should adopt the LRA’s
provisions that expedite NLRB decisions and delays, including those that
would statutorily reduce delays in ALJ appeals processes.372 Furthermore,
as the PRO Act would amend the NLRA to require the Board to give
priority to alleged violations that have involved “discharge or other serious
economic harm,”373 a private right of action for any alleged ULP permits
wronged employees to pursue actions more efficiently and with more
certainty of resolution.
A complete analysis of the effect of various economic penalty values on
corporations based on size, industry, and other profit determinations is
outside the scope of this Note, but the size of the maximum penalty must be
addressed.374 Congress has determined that a maximum penalty for a
single violation should be $50,000, with possible additional awards
depending on the severity of the violation.375 Compared to the LRA’s
double backpay and the EFCA’s triple backpay including possible civil
362. H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. § 2(i)(1)(A) (2020).
363. See Brudney, supra note 15, at 231 (“Employees generally are given the right to sue
without serious restriction . . . . By contrast, the NLRA places enforcement authority
entirely in the hands of the Board . . . .”).
364. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
and 47 U.S.C.).
365. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
366. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(c), 1132(a).
367. See H.R. 2474, § 2(i)(1)(A).
368. See supra notes 134–39 and accompanying text.
369. See Brudney, supra note 15, at 231.
370. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
373. See H.R. 2474, § 2(h)(1)(B).
374. See supra Part II.D.
375. See supra notes 281–85 and accompanying text.
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penalties of $30,000, the PRO Act’s penalties are significant.376 Yet, if one
uses the estimate that the cost of unionization per worker is $40,500,377 an
employer’s net penalty for committing a single ULP would only be around
$10,000.378 Especially as a single ULP may deter other employees from
supporting unionization,379 this penalty seems meager for large,
multinational corporations.380 Future legislation must ensure that the
NLRA is amended to include fines that are hefty enough to deter even the
largest corporations from impeding on the right to collectively bargain.381
Just as the PRO Act directs arbitration panels to do so when determining
the size of awards,382 future reforms should amend the NLRA to direct the
Board, arbitration panels, and courts to take into account various
benchmarks on a sliding scale when deciding the size of a penalty.
Finally, in terms of director and officer liability, future legislation should
implement the potential for criminal liability for the most egregious and
explicit acts committed against employees. Criminal liability is currently
unavailable for ULP violations.383 Unlike its predecessors,384 the PRO Act
would amend the NLRA to give the Board the power to levy civil liability
upon directors and officers.385 With the addition of a private right of
action,386 criminal liability should be considered for egregious conduct.387
As the PRO Act increases the severity of monetary penalties for multiple
offenses,388 criminal liability should be considered only if a director or
officer has, on multiple occasions, explicitly directed a company to carry
out a ULP that involves a discharge or other serious economic harm. The
NLRA should vest the power to levy criminal penalties not within the
Board but through private rights of action.389
CONCLUSION
Although the text of the NLRA has remained almost completely
unchanged for close to seventy years, the need for effective reform has been
lingering for decades. Despite the difficulty of passage that the legislation
will face in the Senate, the PRO Act is the most comprehensive attempt at
private sector labor relations reform in the history of the NLRA. Although
the filibuster remains, reformers continue to fight for effective labor law,
giving unions a hopeful glimpse into the future of labor management
376.
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379.
380.
381.
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383.
384.
385.
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relations. Even if the PRO Act itself does not find its way into the U.S.
Code, this Note proposes a more effective, comprehensive model for reform
based on the 2020 legislation. By addressing every stage of unionization
and the NLRB’s ability to deter coercive activity, the NLRA is ripe for an
amendment to restore its goal of protecting all private sector workers’ rights
to associate and collectively bargain.

